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Abstract
Background: Pay-for-performance (P4P) is increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to encourage
improvements in healthcare quality. P4P is a payment model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-
established targets for delivery of healthcare services by financial incentives. Based on their performance, healthcare
providers receive either additional or reduced payment. Currently, little is known about P4P schemes intending to
improve delivery of chronic care through disease management. The objectives of this paper are therefore to
provide an overview of P4P schemes used to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease management and
to provide insight into their effects on healthcare quality and costs.
Methods: A systematic PubMed search was performed for English language papers published between 2000 and
2010 describing P4P schemes related to the implementation of disease management. Wagner’s chronic care model
was used to make disease management operational.
Results: Eight P4P schemes were identified, introduced in the USA (n = 6), Germany (n = 1), and Australia (n = 1). Five
P4P schemes were part of a larger scheme of interventions to improve quality of care, whereas three P4P schemes
were solely implemented. Most financial incentives were rewards, selective, and granted on the basis of absolute
performance. More variation was found in incented entities and the basis for providing incentives. Information about
motivation, certainty, size, frequency, and duration of the financial incentives was generally limited. Five studies were
identified that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare quality. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P on
healthcare quality. No studies were found that evaluated the effects of P4P on healthcare costs.
Conclusion: The number of P4P schemes to encourage disease management is limited. Hardly any information is
available about the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and costs.
Background
Chronic diseases are the leading cause of disability and
death in the Western part of the world [1]. Over the
coming years, the prevalence of chronic diseases is pre-
dicted to increase as a result of the rapid aging of the
world population and the greater longevity of people
with chronic conditions [2,3]. Healthcare systems strug-
gle with coordinating care to people with chronic condi-
tions. The healthcare system, traditionally predominated
by a re-active approach and consisting of highly specia-
lized echelons, needs to be transformed to realize
patient-centered chronic care in which problems like
fragmentation, restricted self-management, and guideline
non-adherence are limited [4,5].
To deal with this challenge, policymakers and profes-
sionals introduced disease management programs (also
referred to as e.g. case management, integrated care, man-
aged care, and shared care) to enhance quality and conti-
nuity of care for the chronically ill. In broad terms disease
management refers to a patient-centered approach of
coordinated multiple healthcare interventions that aim to
structure chronic care to a specific patient group [4,6]. A
model that is perhaps best known from an international
perspective, and that was used for this study to make dis-
ease management operational, is the Chronic Care Model
(CCM) of Wagner et al. [5,7]. This model can be consid-
ered as a guide towards improving management and co-
ordination of chronic conditions. The model suggests that
disease management ideally comprises six interrelated
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resources, self-management support, decision support,
delivery system design, and clinical information system)
and that integration of these components is the key
towards improving chronic care management [4].
It is generally believed that disease management pro-
grams result into improved patient health outcomes and
into healthcare cost savings. There is, however, a lack of
conclusive scientific evidence supporting these suggestions
[4,6,8,9]. Nevertheless, interest in pay-for-performance
(P4P) as a tool to stimulate delivery of chronic care
through disease management is growing. P4P is a payment
model that rewards healthcare providers for meeting pre-
established targets for delivery of healthcare services by
financial incentives [10]. Based on their performance,
healthcare providers receive either additional or reduced
payment. The reasoning behind P4P schemes is, by either
rewarding or punishing healthcare providers for their per-
formance, to improve quality of care [11,12]. P4P schemes,
also known as e.g. performance based incentive programs
and quality incentive payment systems, should not be con-
fused with funding of disease management. Funding refers
to recompensing delivery of healthcare services by health-
care providers via retrospective (e.g. fee-for-service or
bundled payment) or prospective (e.g. capitation) payment
contracts.
To date, little is known about the use of P4P schemes
to stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease
management and whether such schemes actually affect
healthcare quality and healthcare costs. The objectives of
the present paper are therefore (i) to provide an overview
of P4P schemes that are currently used to stimulate deliv-
ery of chronic care through disease management and (ii)
to gain insight into the effects of P4P on healthcare qual-
ity and healthcare costs.
Methods
Study design and search strategy
A systematic review of the literature was performed for
insight into P4P schemes aiming at stimulation of delivery
of chronic care through disease management. We con-
ducted our search in PubMed focusing on English lan-
guage papers published between January 2000 and January
2010. A comprehensive search strategy was developed by a
librarian of our institute to identify studies matching the
following search terms (Medical Subject Headings): case
management, comprehensive health care, delivery of inte-
grated health care, disease management, managed care
programs, patient care management, patient-centered care,
shared care, transmural care and variations of the key-
words chronic disease, chronically ill, chronic illness, long
term care and specified chronic conditions. These search
terms were combined with variations of the following
search terms: bundled payment, fee for services, health
care reform, incentives, local partnerships, pay for perfor-
mance, payment methods, practice based commissioning,
physician incentive plans, prospective payment system,
quality assurance,a n dreimbursement (mechanisms).
In addition to the electronic database search, relevant
papers were identified through reference tracking and
through a manual literature search on the internet. To
obtain up-to-date information about the included P4P
schemes, also websites of the P4P schemes and other
relevant websites such as those of health insurers and
Ministries of Health were consulted.
Study selection
Two reviewers (JS and SdB) independently reviewed the
papers extracted by the search for their relevance by
screening their title and abstract. If found relevant by
both reviewers, the full-text paper was retrieved. Any dis-
agreement between the reviewers was resolved by con-
sensus. Papers describing P4P schemes focusing on the
implementation of disease management programs were
included.
In line with earlier studies [9,13,14] also in this study
the chronic care model (CCM) of Wagner et al. [5,7] was
used to make disease management operational. The
model suggests that disease management ideally com-
prises six interrelated components. Four components
refer to the actual delivery of care by healthcare providers
o fah e a l t h c a r eo r g a n i z a t i o n ;1 .self-management support
that helps patients and their families to obtain skills and
confidence to manage their chronic condition (e.g. blood
glucose monitoring) and assessment of problems and
achievements on a regular basis; 2. delivery system design;
focus on coordinated multidisciplinary collaboration
between caregivers (i.e. multidisciplinary team, individual
care plans); 3. decision support; evidence-based guidelines
providing clinical standards for high-quality chronic care,
and 4. development of clinical information systems;s u p -
plying care teams with feedback, reminding them to
comply with practice guidelines and providing registries
for planning individual and population-based care [7,15].
The two remaining components mainly refer to the con-
text where chronic care is provided: 5. the healthcare sys-
tem which encompasses the aforementioned elements,
refers to the organizational context where chronic care is
provided. A healthcare system seeking to improve
chronic care must be motivated and prepared for change
throughout the organization. Leadership must identify
care improvement as important work, and translate it
into clear improvement goals and policies that are
addressed through application of effective improvement
strategies and 6. links towards community resources and
policies. The healthcare system is embedded in a commu-
nity that includes organizations/programs that may sup-
port or expand a healthcare system’s care for chronically
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local fitness centre). In our study, the term disease man-
agement was used for programs that included interven-
tions that could be related to two or more components
of the CCM.
Data extraction
P4P schemes identified by the literature search were
described on the basis of the nine dimensions of P4P
schemes defined by Conrad and Perry [10] (Table 1).
This classification was used to systematically disentangle
the P4P schemes. We additionally reported the country
where the scheme was introduced, the CCM elements
to which the scheme could be related, and the goal of
each scheme (Table 2). Of the papers reporting studies
that evaluated the effects of P4P on quality of healthcare
and healthcare costs we described the characteristics of
the evaluation study (e.g. design, sample size, years of
data collection), outcome measures, and study outcomes
(Table 3).
Results
Paper retrieval
Our literature search yielded 147 potentially relevant
papers. On the basis of their title and abstract, 52 papers
were selected to be retrieved full-text for in-depth
screening. This screening process resulted into 12
papers eligible for our review. Reasons for exclusion are
given in Figure 1. Additionally, six papers were identi-
fied through reference tracking and through a manual
literature search on the internet. Hence, 18 papers were
included in our review. The 18 papers described eight
different P4P schemes that intend to improve chronic
care delivery through disease management (Table 2).
Some papers described the same P4P scheme which
helped us to retrieve the fullest possible information
about the different characteristics of the P4P schemes.
Characteristics pay-for-performance schemes
General characteristics
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the eight included
P4P schemes. Six P4P schemes were introduced in the
USA: 1. the Western New York Physician Incentive Pro-
ject (WNY-PIP) [16]; 2. Performance Based Incentive
Program of Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield (PBIP)
[12,17]; 3. Partners Community Healthcare Inc./Brigham
and Women’s Hospital Physicians Organization pay-for-
performance program (BWPO-P4P) [18,19]; 4. Bridges
to Excellence Program (BTE) [12,20-23]; 5. Integrated
Healthcare Association pay-for-performance program
(IHA-P4P) [24-31]; and 6. the Medicare Physician
Group Practice Demonstration (MPGPD) [32,33]. One
P4P scheme was introduced in Germany: 7. Scheme to
stimulate sickness funds to enroll patients in German
Table 1 Features of P4P schemes and their dimensions
Feature Dimensions
1. Type ￿ Reward: incentive implies increase in payments
￿ Penalty: incentive implies decrease in payments
2. Nature incented entity ￿ Individual: incentive is granted to an individual (e.g. healthcare provider such as GP)
￿ Group: incentive is granted to a group (e.g. clinical team, GP practice, hospital trust)
3. Focal quality behavior targeted
by incentive
￿ Structure: incentives are based on resources assembled to deliver care (including personnel, facilities, IT, and
materials)
￿ Process: incentives are based on the completion of specific tasks or recommended treatments (e.g.
performance measures, clinical quality)
￿ Outcome: incentives are based on ultimate results of care (e.g. patient experience, health status, morbidity,
and mortality)
4. Scope ￿ General: incentives target at general domain of quality (e.g. payment for each patient enrolled in disease
management program).
￿ Selective: incentives target a specific domain of quality (e.g. periodic blood pressure readings or cholesterol
screening)
5. Motivation ￿ Intrinsic: incentive affects intrinsic motivation to deliver high quality care (e.g. patient benefit)
￿ Extrinsic: incentive affects extrinsic motivation to deliver high quality care (e.g. economic interest)
6. Scale ￿ Relative: incentive is paid for achieving a given comparative ranking among providers (e.g. hospitals in top 2
performing quartiles are offered increases in tariff payments)
￿ Absolute: incentives is paid for a continuous gradient of quality improvement (e.g. sickness funds receive
higher payments for each patient enrolled in disease management program)
7. Size ￿ Amount of money provided or withdrawn
8. Certainty ￿ Certain: incented entity is certain about achievability of targets (e.g. targets seem easily achievable;
guaranteed reward schedule)
￿ Uncertain: incented entity is uncertain about achievability of targets (e.g. targets seem not easily achievable;
competition for limited funds)
9. Frequency and duration ￿ Frequency: number of times a year an incentive is provided
￿ Duration: number of years an incentive is provided
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Pay-for-
performance
scheme
Country Elements chronic care
model
Goal and patient
population
Type Incented entity Focal quality
behavior
Scope Motivation Scale Size Certainty
Frequency
and duration
Schemes in which financial incentives are granted to healthcare providers for delivering chronic care through disease management
Western New
York Physician
Incentive
Program (WNY-
PIP) [16]
USA P4P simultaneously
implemented with:
1. change in delivery
system design
(establishment of new
routines in physician’s
office)
2. decision support (e.g.
assessment tools, educating
and training physician
office staff, reflective
information feedback )
3. self-management
support (e.g. providing
patient education materials)
1. To improve
chronic care
treatment for
diabetes patients
2. To explore
effectiveness of
financial incentives
in improving care
for this patient
population
3. To promote new
routines in
physician’s office
Ultimate goal:
improve patient
health
Reward Individual:
Physician
Process:
6 clinical QI based on
ADA clinical guideline
Outcome: 3 patient
outcome indicators
Selective: health
plans pay financial
incentives based on
composite score on
process and
outcome indicators
N.A. Absolute
1. scoring above
predetermined target
on composite score
based on performance
on process and
outcome indicators
2. 50% improvement in
composite score
Size of reward depends
on weighted composite
score.
Actual payments varied
from $3,000 till $12,000
(2003)
13 of
21
physician
earned a
financial
reward.
Annually
Performance
Based Incentive
Program (PBIP)
Highmark Blue
Cross Blue
Shield [12,17]
USA P4P simultaneously
implemented with:
1. decision support (e.g. up
to date clinical physician
guidelines, reflective
information feedback,
regular review by medical
management consultant)
2. clinical information
system (e.g. sharing
practice specific data with
other physicians for
benchmarking)
Encourage
healthcare
providers to deliver
best possible
quality care and
encourage
coordinated care
(patient population
unknown)
Reward Group: physician
groups (not
further specified)
Structure: electronic
connectivity,
Process: clinical quality
Outcome: patient
satisfaction
N.A. N.A. Relative: physician
groups are rewarded if
they exceed other
physicians (in and out
of the program) in
performance on
structure, process, and
outcome indicators
N.A. N.A. N.A.
Partners
Community
Healthcare Inc./
Brigham and
Women’s
Physicians
Organization
pay-for-
performance
program
(BWPO-P4P)
[18,19]
USA P4P simultaneously
implemented with:
1. decision support (e.g.
non-physician staff contact
patients and physicians to
improve compliance with
practice guidelines)
2. change in delivery
system design (e.g. central
diabetes patient outreach
coordinator tracking data
and performance progress
and checking compliance
of patients; home visits)
3. clinical information
system (adoption of
electronic medical records
and claims that track
patient screening data
(HEDIS) for e.g.
benchmarking; central
office sending reminder
letters).
Improve quality
and efficiency of
care within the
organization with
regard to inpatient
admissions,
radiology, diabetes
care, and asthma
care.
Only P4P scheme
for diabetes and
asthma care are
relevant for our
review.
Penalty:
programs
operate by
withholding
10% of
physician/
hospital fees
and returning
those fees based
on whether
quality and
efficiency targets
are achieved
Group: network of
primary care
physicians,
ophthalmologists,
and staff
Process: clinical quality
according to HEDIS
measures Outcome:
achieving target
outcomes
Shift from performance
targets that focus on
process indicators to
targets that focus on
outcome indicators
Selective: incentives
based on
performance on
process and
outcome indicators.
N.A. Relative, withhold is
returned if network:
1. scores above state or
national 90
th percentile
of HEDIS targets
2. improves baseline
performance Some
regional service
organizations provide
additional incentives
directly to physicians
whose patients meet
HEDIS targets and
many regional service
organizations provide
bonuses for non-clinical
staff members who are
critical to success of
these programs
Portion of withholding
that will be returned
depends on
performance on HEDIS
measure (in 2006:
moderate-volume
primary care physician
practices could earn
additional $3000 to
$5000 per physician if
network met P4P HEDIS
targets)
N.A. AnnuallyTable 2 General characteristics pay-for-performance schemes (Continued)
Bridges to
Excellence
program (BTE)
[12,20-23]
USA P4P to stimulate
implementation of:
1. self-management
support (e.g. patient
education, shared decision-
making)
2. decision support (e.g.
clinical standards set by
NCQA/ADA)
3. clinical information
system (e.g. adoption of
electronic systems to
maintain medical records
documenting care delivery
for reflective information
feedback/benchmarking)
Create significant
improvements in
quality of asthma
care, cardiac care,
congestive heart
failure care,
coronary artery
disease care,
depression care,
diabetes care,
hypertension care,
and spine care by
recognizing and
rewarding health
care providers for
implementing
elements of CCM
and delivering safe,
timely, effective,
efficient, equitable,
and patient-
centered care
Reward: higher
revenue
Individual:
physicians, nurse
practitioners, and
physician
assistants certified
through provider
recognition
program of NCQA
Structure: clinicians
should comply with
standards for clinical
information systems
Process: clinicians
should comply with
national standards for
clinical care
management, patient
education and support
Selective: incentive
based on whether
healthcare
providers meet a
set of structure and
process measures,
which are scored to
create overall
program score
where 60 is most
often the passing
grade.
N.A. Absolute: incentive is
provided when
healthcare professionals
meet certain
performance measures.
Each measure has an
assigned maximum
available point value.
Clinicians achieve
points for a measure
based on the % of
patient sample that
meets or exceeds the
set thresholds for that
measure.
Depends on level of
performance. Size of
rewards changes over
time and differs
between health plans
that participate in
Bridges to Excellence.
N.A. Annually
Integrated
Healthcare
Association
Pay-for-
performance
Program (IHA-
P4P) [24-29,31]
USA P4P to stimulate
implementation of:
1. change in delivery
system design (e.g.
redesigning processes and
creating a systematic
approach to diabetes care
such as registries,
actionable reports, and care
management processes)
2. decision support (using
evidence-based national
measures)
3. clinical information
system (e.g. adoption
infrastructure for systematic
processes of care; electronic
medical records, reminder
systems, reflective
information feedback,
benchmarking).
Stimulate provider
organizations to
consistently
demonstrate high
levels of quality
performance with
regard to
preventive care,
treatment of acute
conditions, and
treatment of
chronic conditions
(asthma, diabetes,
and coronary heart
disease) through
public recognition
and financial
reward
Only financial
incentives for
chronic conditions
are relevant for our
review.
Reward: provider
groups earn
financial rewards
if they
participate in
the program
and perform
well on selected
measures
Group: physician
groups
Structure: adoption of
IT enabled system to
support patient care
Process: 1. clinical
quality: preventive
screening, treatment of
asthma, diabetes, and
coronary artery disease;
2. coordinated diabetes
care
Outcome: patient
experience
Measure set is dynamic
with new measures
added each year.
Selective: health
plans pay financial
incentives based on
composite score on
established
structure, process,
and outcome
measures.
Composite score is
calculated and then
weighted: clinical
quality 55%, patient
experience 25%,
coordinated
diabetes registry
5%, IT enabled
systemness 15%,
resulting in overall
performance score
N.A. Absolute:
Physician groups may
receive incentive
incremental financial
payment for scoring in
any of the category
measures as long as
the group scores in the
appropriate percentile
ranking as determined
by the health plan.
Each health plan that
participates in IHA-P4P
scheme determines its
own budget and
methodology for
calculating and
distributing payments
to physician groups. On
average about 1% of
base income of
physician group (in
2009).
N.A. AnnuallyTable 2 General characteristics pay-for-performance schemes (Continued)
Practice
Incentive
Program
Diabetes
Incentive (PIP-
DI) [35-38]
Australia P4P simultaneously
implemented with:
1. self-management
support (e.g. patient
education in line with so-
called diabetes and asthma
cycles of care: minimum
requirements to diabetes
care based on national
guidelines)
2. decision support (e.g.
working in line with
diabetes and asthma cycles
of care), including support
from regional primary care
organization to encourage
uptake
3. clinical information
system (e.g. improvement
of IT infrastructure)
To encourage GP’s
to effectively
manage clinical
diabetes and
asthma care,
mental health care
and cervical
screening. Only
financial incentives
for diabetes and
asthma care are
relevant for our
review.
Practices had to
become accredited
against standards
of RACP.
Reward:
incremental
income
Group: GP
practice
Structure: use of patient
register and recall/
reminder system
Process: delivery of care
according to national
guidelines
Selective: incentives
based on
compliance with
structure and
process measures
N.A. Absolute: incentive is
provided when GP
practices meet
requirements
Diabetes
$1 per standardized
whole patient
equivalent (SWPE)
when using patient
register and recall/
reminder system (sign-
on payment)
$20 per patient to
practices where at least
2% of patients are
diagnosed with
diabetes and GPs have
completed a cycle of
care for at least 20% of
these patients
(outcomes payment)
$40 per patient per
year for each
completed cycle of
care (service incentive
payment)
Asthma $0.25 per SWPE
to practices that
implement a cycle of
care for patients with
moderate to severe
diabetes (sign-on
payment)
$100 per patient per
year for each
completed cycle of
care for patients with
moderate to severe
asthma
N.A. Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Once
QuarterlyTable 2 General characteristics pay-for-performance schemes (Continued)
Medicare
Physician
Group Practice
Demonstration
(MPGPD)
[32,33]
USA P4P simultaneously
implemented with:
1. self-management
support (e.g. patient
education, active
communication of patients
with physicians and nurses,
maintaining diet and
exercise programs)
2. change in delivery
system design (e.g.
delegating tasks of
physicians to non-
physicians)
3. clinical information
systems (e.g. electronic
medical records, patient
monitoring systems)
Quality
improvement and
cost efficiency of
diabetes care, heart
failure care, cardiac
care, and
preventive care at
the level of the
PGP
Reward Group: PGP Process: clinical quality
according to HEDIS
measures
Outcome: clinical
quality according to
HEDIS measures
32 indicators are subset
of CMS Quality
Measurement and
Health assessment
Group for the Doctors
Office Quality and
comprise both process
and outcome
indicators.
Selective: Incentives
based on
performance on
broad range of
quality indicators
which focused on
diabetes mellitus,
heart failure,
coronary artery
disease and
hypertension, and
preventive care.
N.A. Absolute and relative
Absolute: if cost saving
≥2% of target
expenditures then 20%
directly to Medicare
and 80% to PGP. The
portion provided to
PGP is divided in cost
performance payment
(fixed payment) and
quality performance
payment.
Quality performance
payment is based on
absolute and/or relative
performance. To earn
payment, PGP must
achieve for each
indicator at least 1 of 3
targets: 1. achieve
≥75% compliance or
HEDIS mean for the
measure (absolute); 2.
achieve 70
th percentile
Medicare level (relative);
3. demonstrate ≥10%
improvement in
compliance (absolute)
A shared savings
provider payment
model in which savings
are shared between
participating physician
groups and the
Medicare groups. A
higher portion of the
saving can be retained
by PGP by good
performance on
indicators.
Size depends on score
on quality indicators. In
total 2 PGPs received
performance payments
of in total $7.3 million
as their share in the
total saving of $9.5
million.
2o f
10
PGP
earned a
reward.
Annually
Schemes in which financial incentives are granted to health insurers to enroll patients in disease management programs
Incentive to
stimulate
sickness funds
to enroll
patients in
disease
management
program (DMP-
P4P) [34]
Germany P4P to stimulate
implementation of certified
DMPs.
Information about when
DMPs are classified as
“certified” is limited.
However, the following
CCM elements are
considered as important
components of DMPs:
1. self-management
support (e.g. patient
education)
2. clinical information
systems (e.g. quality
management systems,
feedback systems)
Stimulate sickness
funds to enroll
chronically ill
patients (diabetes
type 1 and 2,
coronary heart
disease, breast
cancer, asthma, and
COPD) in DMPs
which are expected
to improve quality
and cost-
effectiveness of
healthcare for
patients with
chronic conditions
Reward: sickness
funds that set
op DMPs are
rewarded with
additional
payments from
risk adjustment
scheme
Group: sickness
funds
Structure: setting-up
certified disease
management program
General: if sickness
funds set up
certified DMPs and
are able to enroll a
high number of
chronically ill
patients for the
relevant disease,
they receive
additional
payments from risk
adjustment scheme.
If sickness funds do
not set up DMPs or
if they are able to
do so but are not
able to enroll a
high number of
chronically ill
patients, they will
receive fewer
payments from the
risk adjustment
scheme
N.A. Absolute: sickness funds
receive higher
payments for patients
enrolled in certified
DMP
Payments from risk
adjustment system. Size
unknown.
N.A. N.A.
Notes: ADA = American Diabetes Association; CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; DMP = disease management program; HEDIS = Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set; N.A.= not available: information about these
characteristics was not documented in the papers that we retrieved through our search process and/or could not be obtained from relevant websites; NCQA = National Committee for Quality Assurance; PGP = physician practice group; P4P = pay-for-
performance; QI = quality indicators; RACP = Royal Australian College of General Practitioners.Table 3 Effects pay-for-performance on healthcare quality
Incentive Study design (N) Year(s)
data
collection
Relevant outcome measures Healthcare quality
Western New York
Physician Incentive
Program (WNY-
P4P) [16]
Pre-post test
Experimental group: patients (n =
624) whose physicians (n = 21)
participated in P4P scheme
Control group: sample of diabetic
patients from health plan
2002-2003 ￿ Quality of care based on a
composite score which was based
on process and outcome measures.
￿ Average of physician’s composite
scores increased 48% (baseline to
end of project).
￿ 13 out of 21 physicians improved
their average composite score
enough to earn some level of
financial reward.
￿ Of the 8 physicians not receiving
reward, 6 improved their composite
score.
Integrated
Healthcare
Association Pay-for-
performance
Program (IHA-P4P)
[30]
Cross-sectional analysis of linked
2006 clinical performance scores
from IHA-P4P and survey data from
the 2
nd National Study of Physician
Organizations among 108 California
physician organizations.
2006 ￿ Association between clinical
performance and the use of chronic
management processes
￿ Association between clinical
performance and electronic medical
record capabilities
￿ Association between clinical
performance and participation in
external quality improvement
initiatives.
￿ Physician organizations investing
more heavily in care management
processes (e.g. patient registries,
physician reminders and feedback,
patient reminders and education)
may achieve better performance
scores.
￿ Use of organized quality
improvement efforts (e.g.
participation in QI program) may be
associated with increased delivery of
recommended care processes, which
in the context of the study
translated into better performance
on the clinical measures that were
rewarded in the P4P scheme.
Practice Incentive
Program Diabetes
Incentive (PIP-DI)
[38]
Retrospective study based on dataset
from BEACH study (data from 100
consecutive encounters of 1000 GPs
that are yearly randomly selected.
Each encounter contains data on up
to 4 problems treated, drugs
prescribed, treatments conducted,
referrals written and pathology).
N = 12187: 1. Treatment group 1:
accredited practices that use IT for
internet, prescribing and medical
records; 2. Treatment group 2:
practices that are accredited and do
not use IT for internet, prescribing
and medical records; 3. Control
group: practices that are not
accredited and do not use IT, for
internet, prescribing and medical
records.
April
2002-
March
2007 from
￿ Percentage of patients that
received a glycosylated haemoglobin
blood test during GP consult
￿ PIP-DI increased probability of a
HbA1c test being ordered by 20
percentage points.
￿ For patients from Aboriginal and
Torres Straight Islander background
the increase was more than 35
percentage points.
Practice Incentive
Program Diabetes
Incentive (PIP-DI)
[37]
Descriptive study based on semi
structured face-to-face interviews (22
GP practices)
2003 ￿ Implementation of components of
diabetes cycle of care
￿ Financial incentives may promote
better clinical management. GPs
claiming incentives were more likely
to comply with all requirements
than GPs that did not claim
incentives.
External incentives
(including financial
incentives). [39]
Cross-sectional study: telephone
survey among 1104 physician
organizations (PO) with 20 or more
physicians
2000-2001 ￿ Extent of use of organized CMPs
on the basis of summary measure:
PO care management index, external
incentives (bonus from health plans,
public recognition, better contracts
with health plans) quality reporting
to outside organization (HEDIS data,
clinical outcome data, results of
quality improvement projects,
patient satisfaction data), IT use
￿ External incentives and clinical IT
were most strongly associated with
CMP use.
￿ Use of the most strongly associated
incentives (public recognition and
better contracts for healthcare
quality) was associated with use of
1.3 and 0.7 additional CMPs
(significant).
￿ Receiving a bonus for scoring well
on quality of care measures was not
significantly associated with CMP
use.
Notes: BEACH = Bettering the Evaluation and Care of Health; CMP = care management processes; FFS = fee for services; HEDIS = Health Plan Employer Data and
Information Set; PO = physician organization; P4P = pay-for-performance; QI = quality improvement.
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DMP-P4P) [34]. One P4P scheme was introduced in
Australia: 8. Practice Incentive Program Diabetes Incen-
tive (PIP-DI) [35-38].
We distinguished two categories of P4P schemes: 1.
P4P schemes in which financial incentives are granted
to healthcare providers for delivering chronic care
through disease management. In these schemes, rewards
are granted by health insurers, health plans or managed
care organizations if healthcare providers deliver chronic
care via disease management programs (WNY-P4P,
PBIP, BWPO-P4P, BTE, IHA-P4P, PIP-DI, and
MPGPD) and 2. P4P schemes in which financial incen-
tives are granted to health insurers to motivate them to
enroll patients in disease management programs (DMP-
P4P). In this scheme sickness funds are rewarded by the
German government for enrolling patients in disease
management programs.
Elements of CCM
Five of the eight included P4P schemes were part of a
larger scheme of interventions (i.e. quality improvement
program) to improve quality of chronic care (WNY-PIP,
PBIP, BWPO-P4P, PIP-DI, and MPGPD). In these
schemes, P4P was simultaneously implemented with
other interventions that can be related to elements of
the CCM. Financial incentives were directed at health-
care providers to reward their participation in these
schemes of quality improvement interventions. Three of
the eight included P4P schemes were solely implemen-
ted (BTE, IHA-P4P, and DMP-P4P). In these P4P
schemes, financial incentives are directed at healthcare
providers or health insurers to stimulate them to
Potentially relevant papers
identified by literature search:
N=147
Papers excluded: n=95. Reasons for
exclusion:
1. No financial incentives and disease
management (n=43)
2. Financial incentives not in relation to
disease management (n=2)
3. Disease management not in relation to
financial incentives (n=39)
4. Language/year of publication did not
meet inclusion criteria (n=11)
Full-text papers retrieved for
in-depth screening: n=52
Papers excluded: n=40. Main reasons for
exclusion:
1. No financial incentives and disease
management (n=6)
2. Financial incentives not in relation to
disease management (n=8)
3. Disease management not in relation to
financial incentives (n=16)
4. Financial incentives briefly mentioned,
not specified (n=9)
5. Not available (n=1)
Papers included in review:
n=18
Papers retrieved by
reference tracking/manual
search: n=6
Figure 1 Flow chart of literature screening process.
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Page 9 of 14implement interventions that can be related to elements
of the CCM. In these schemes, financial incentives are
granted after the implementation of interventions
related to elements of the CCM.
Irrespective of the type of P4P scheme (i.e. P4P
schemes part of a larger scheme of interventions vs. sole
P4P schemes), we determined that the schemes stimu-
lated delivery of chronic care through disease manage-
ment by interventions that can be related to the same
CCM elements. Interventions related to the CCM ele-
ments “decision support” (e.g. clinical guidelines, assess-
ment tools) and “adoption of a clinical information
system” (e.g. electronic medical records, reminder let-
ters, sharing practice specific data for benchmarking and
reflective information feedback) were observed in almost
all P4P schemes. Self-management support interventions
(e.g. patient education) were observed in WNY-P4P,
PIP-DI, MPGPD, and DMP-P4P, whereas delivery sys-
tem design interventions (e.g. home visits, patient out-
reach coordinator) were only observed in the WNY-
P4P, MPGPD, and BWPO-P4P.
Goals
Generally, the goals of the P4P schemes were to stimu-
late delivery of high-quality and cost-effective chronic
care, and ultimately to improve patient health. Most
P4P schemes focused on delivery of integrated care for
diabetes and/or asthma (WNY-P4P; BWPO-P4P; BTE;
IHA; PIP-DI; MPGPD; DMP-P4P). Some P4P schemes
additionally focused on care to other chronic patients
including cardiac care (BTE; IHA-P4P; MPDGP),
depression care (BTE), and COPD care (DMP-P4P),
while of one P4P scheme the targeted patient population
was unknown (PBIP).
Type
In seven of the eight P4P schemes, financial incentives
were framed as rewards for delivering chronic care
through disease management (WNY-P4P; PBIP; BTE;
IHA-P4P; PIP-DI; MPGPD) or for enrolling patients in
disease management programs (DMP-P4P). In one P4P
scheme (BWPO-P4P), the financial incentive was framed
as a penalty. Annual physician or hospital fees were
withheld and were only returned if quality targets were
achieved.
Incented entity
The incented entities differed over the eight included
P4P schemes. In seven P4P schemes, financial incentives
were granted to healthcare providers of which five were
granted to groups of healthcare providers (e.g. physician
groups, multidisciplinary groups of caregivers) (PBIP;
B W P O - P 4 P ;I H A - P 4 P ;P I P - D I ;M P G P D ) ,w h e r e a st w o
were granted to individual healthcare providers (e.g.
recognized physician, nurse practitioner, physician assis-
tant) (WNY-P4P; BTE). In one P4P scheme, the finan-
cial incentive was granted to sickness funds (DMP-P4P).
Focal quality behavior
In most P4P schemes, financial incentives were granted
on the basis of performance on a combination of struc-
ture (n = 6) and/or process indicators (n = 6). Perfor-
mance on outcome indicators was less frequently used
as a basis for granting financial incentives (n = 4). In
one P4P scheme, the financial incentive was only based
on performance on structure indicators (DMP-P4P). In
two P4P schemes, financial incentives were based on
performance on structure and process outcomes (BTE;
PIP-DI). In three P4P schemes, financial incentives were
based on performance on process and outcome indica-
tors (WNY-PIP; BWPO-P4P; MPGPD) and in two P4P
schemes, financial incentives were based on structure,
process, and outcome indicators (PBIP; IHA-P4P).
Structure indicators were mostly based on the use of
IT services (e.g. patient registries, recall/reminder sys-
tem, electronic medical recor d s )( e . g .B T E ;P I P - D I )o r
having implemented a certified program (DMP-P4P).
Process measures targeted at clinical quality (e.g. work-
ing according to national standards of clinical care man-
agement, patient education and support) and were often
a subset of the Health Plan Employer Data and Informa-
tion Set (HEDIS) (e.g. BWPO-P4P; BTE; IHA-P4P;
MPGPD). Of the four financial incentives that were
(partly) granted on the basis of performance on outcome
measures, two P4P schemes targeted at patient experi-
ence/satisfaction (PBIP; IHA-P4P) whereas three finan-
cial incentives (WNY-P4P; BWPO-P4P, MPGPD)
targeted at clinical outcome (i.e. % of patients with
HbA1c value ≤ 7.5 or blood pressure ≤ 130/80).
Scope
Selective incentives were observed in six P4P schemes
(WNY-P4P; BWPO-P4P; BTE; IHA-P4P; PIP-DI;
MPGPD). These incentives targeted at specific domains
of quality (e.g. periodic blood pressure readings, choles-
terol screening, HbA1c screening) and were granted on
the basis of scoring on established criteria of quality
performance. A general incentive was observed in one
P4P scheme (DMP-P4P). This incentive targeted at a
general domain of quality, i.e. whether or not sickness
funds set up disease management programs. The scope
of one P4P scheme was unknown (PBIP).
Motivation
Information about whether the P4P-schemes affect
intrinsic or extrinsic motivation to deliver high quality
care was lacking in the papers that we included in our
review. We therefore can not provide any information
about this characteristic of the included P4P schemes.
Scale
Absolute performance incentives were observed in six
P4P schemes (WNY-P4P; BTE; IHA; PIP-DI; DMP-P4P;
MPGPD). Incentives were granted if healthcare provi-
ders or sickness funds meet established performance
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observed in three P4P schemes (PBIP; PIP-DI; MPGPD).
Healthcare providers participating in these programs
only received bonus paymenti ft h e ye x c e e d e dp e r f o r -
mance of other healthcare providers.
Certainty
Five of the P4P schemes (WNY-PIP; BTE; IHA-P4P;
PIP-DI; DMP-P4P) had guaranteed reward schedules,
provided that established targets were achieved. Two
studies illustrate by the number of physicians not receiv-
ing a reward that, despite the (partly) guaranteed reward
schedules, targets established in the P4P schemes may
not be easily achievable. A study evaluating the WNY-
PIP showed that 13 out of 21 physicians earned a finan-
cial reward [16]. Also a study that evaluated the
MPGPD, a scheme where rewards are granted on the
basis of absolute and relative performance, showed that
2 out of 10 physician groups earned a financial reward
[32].
In three P4P schemes (PBIP; BWPO-P4P; MPGPD),
providing financial incentives was (partly) based on high
relative performance. Rewarding only the top performers
creates competition. This approach introduces uncer-
tainty because a bonus depends not only on a healthcare
providers’ own performance but also on that of other
healthcare providers in the network. Healthcare provi-
ders don’t know in advance whether they will exceed
competing healthcare providers.
Size, frequency, and duration
Of most P4P schemes, size, frequency, and duration of
the financial incentives were not or only briefly
described. Of six P4P schemes (WNY-PIP; PIP-DI;
BWPO-P4P; BTE, IHA-P4P; MPGPD) some information
was available about the incentive size. Of four of these
incentives, the size depended on the composite perfor-
mance score (WNY-P4P; BWPO-P4P; BTE; MPGPD).
The precise size of rewards could change over time and
could differ between the health plans that participated
in the quality improvement programs. Health plans that
participated in the IHA-P4P scheme determined their
own budget and methodology for calculating and distri-
buting payments to physician groups (IHA-P4P).
Healthcare providers participating in PIP-DI received
payment per standardized whole patient equivalent (IT
structure) or per patient (that completed a cycle of
care). No information was available about the size of the
financial incentives granted via the PBIP and DMP-P4P.
Effects pay-for-performance schemes
Of the 18 included papers, only five reported effects of
P4P on healthcare quality [16,30,37-39], whereas no
papers were found that reported the effects of P4P on
healthcare costs. Of the five papers, four reported the
effects of specified P4P schemes (WNY-PIP; PIP-DI;
IHA-P4P) on healthcare performance, whereas one
paper reported the effects of financial incentives in gen-
eral versus the effects of other external incentives.
The evaluated aspects of healthcare delivery differed
over the studies. The studies showed positive effects of
P4P on the quality of care delivered. Scott et al. [38]
revealed that PIP-DI increased the probability of a
HbA1c test being ordered which implies a positive effect
on quality of care in diabetes management. In the other
study on PIP-DI, physicians were asked to what extent
they implemented the nationally established minimum
requirements to diabetes care. The study indicates that
financial incentives promote better clinical management
of diabetes patients: GPs claiming financial incentives
were more likely to comply with all requirements than
GPs that did not claim incentives [37]. Also the study
that evaluated the effects of WNY-PIP on healthcare
quality showed that the majority of the participating
physicians improved their average score on process (i.e.
screening of clinical parameters) and outcome (i.e.
patient outcome) indicators [16]. The study evaluating
the effects of IHA-P4P found that quality improvement
efforts, such as P4P schemes, are positively related with
improved delivery of clinical processes of care.
The study that evaluated the effects of external incen-
tives, including financial incentives, did not find a signif-
icant relationship between receiving a financial reward
for scoring well on quality of care measures between
organized care management processes. However, signifi-
cant relationships were found for other external incen-
tives such as public recognition and better contracts for
healthcare quality and organized care management pro-
cesses [39].
Discussion
This systematic literature review presents an overview of
P4P schemes that are currently used to stimulate deliv-
ery of chronic care through disease management and
provides insights into their effects. P4P schemes are
increasingly implemented in the healthcare system to
encourage improvements in healthcare quality. Well-
known examples of such schemes are the Hospital Qual-
ity Incentive Demonstration Project introduced in the
U S Aa n dt h eN H SQ u a l i t ya n dO u t c o m e sF r a m e w o r k
and the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Pay-
ment Framework introduced in the UK [12,21,40,41].
The increasing number of implemented P4P schemes
has led to a mounting number of studies on the effects
of such schemes. These studies have, however, not spe-
cified their results for P4P schemes that are used to sti-
mulate delivery of chronic care through disease
management [42-44]. The increasing number of disease
management programs that have been implemented
over the last years, has urged the need for insight into
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management programs.
The included P4P schemes were systematically disen-
tangled according to the dimensions of P4P schemes
defined by Conrad and Perry [10]. This classification is
in line with the characterization of P4P schemes of
other authors who have recently published their work in
this field [e.g. 12, 43, 45]. Systematically describing the
P4P schemes facilitated comparison of their characteris-
tics and effects. This process revealed that retrieving
complete and up-to-date information about the charac-
teristics of P4P schemes was difficult. In most papers
schemes were not well-described and information given
was often dated. Particularly, information about the cer-
tainty, motivation, size, frequency, and duration of the
P4P schemes was difficult to obtain.
The included P4P schemes were rather similar in their
goals (i.e. improving quality, continuity, and efficiency of
care for the chronically ill) but differed in how to
achieve these goals. Financial incentives targeting at
healthcare providers strived for improvement of quality
and continuity of care by stimulating healthcare provi-
ders to deliver chronic care through disease manage-
ment, whereas incentives targeting at health insurers
strived for improvement of quality and continuity of
care by stimulating health insurers to enroll patients in
disease management programs. We did not identify P4P
schemes in combination with financial incentives for
patients (e.g. rewarding patients for participating in dis-
ease management programs).
The included P4P schemes mostly stimulated delivery
of chronic care through disease management by inter-
ventions that can be related to the CCM elements “deci-
sion support” and “clinical information system”.T h i s
finding can possibly be explained by the fact that inter-
ventions related to these CCM elements are mostly
implemented before interventions related to the other
elements of the CCM [13,14].
Our literature review yielded only five papers that
reported studies on the effects of P4P on healthcare
quality [16,30,37-39]. No papers were found that
reported studies evaluating the effects of P4P on health-
care costs. Most studies showed positive effects of P4P
on the quality of care delivered. It should, however, be
noted that the observed differences between schemes
hinders comparability of their effects on healthcare qual-
ity and as a consequence drawing conclusions on the
effectiveness of P4P to stimulate delivery of chronic care
through disease management in general. It is therefore
not possible to determine the characteristics of P4P
schemes that may contribute to improved healthcare
quality. This is in line with earlier studies that suggest
that the effectiveness of P4P schemes is highly variable
in terms of e.g. complications, ER waiting times, length
of hospital stay, and screening rates and that the effec-
tiveness depends on the design of the schemes and the
characteristics of the context where they are introduced
[11,43,44]. It should further be noted, that since our
study mainly yielded studies showing positive effects of
P4P schemes, publication bias should be taken into
account. Since almost no studies were found showing
no effects of P4P, it is difficult to determine the charac-
teristics of P4P schemes that may not affect healthcare
quality and healthcare costs.
Another issue which complicates drawing conclu-
sions with regard to the effectiveness of P4P, which is
also highlighted by other authors, is that P4P schemes
are often not solely implemented [i.e. 19, 44]. Also the
P4P schemes included in this study were mostly part
of a larger scheme of interventions and were simulta-
neously implemented with other interventions than
can be related to elements of the CCM such as patient
registries, physician reminders and feedback, and the
implementation of evidence-based guidelines and pro-
tocols. Such interventions also focus on changing
healthcare providers’ behavior and may interact with
the potential effect of P4P. It is therefore difficult to
determine the isolated effect of P4P on healthcare
quality and related costs. Additionally, as also men-
tioned by Chaix-Couturier et al. [11] and Christianson
et al. [44], contextual factors like the characteristics of
the healthcare system where the P4P scheme is imple-
mented (e.g. healthcare purchasing system, degree of
regulation, financing mechanisms of the healthcare sys-
tem), organizational aspects of the healthcare organiza-
tion where the P4P scheme is implemented, and
personal characteristics of the healthcare providers
participating in the P4P scheme may also interact with
the effect of the scheme and therefore further compli-
cates comparability of the effects of P4P schemes.
Hence, to interpret the results of the included studies
it is also relevant to have information about the
healthcare system where the P4P scheme is implemen-
ted and the simultaneously implemented interventions
and their features.
Although the aforementioned issues complicate draw-
ing conclusions with regard to which P4P schemes are
most successful, there are some indications for the
design characteristics of P4P schemes that may produce
the largest effects. First, payment on the basis of scoring
on process-based incentives may be more effective than
indicators that are less directly related to a healthcare
providers’ performance [10,43]. Second, P4P schemes
including a blend of individual- and group-level incen-
tives may be more effective than P4P schemes only
including individual or only including group-level incen-
tives. Some performance issues can be improved most
efficiently through group action, whereas others can be
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[10,43,45]. Third, there are indications that P4P schemes
rewarding absolute performance may be more effective
than schemes rewarding relative performance. Reward-
ing relative performance may create uncertainty about
the amount of additional revenue that can be obtained,
because one’s reward depends on the performance of
other healthcare providers in the network. This, in turn,
may result into unwillingness of providers to make
investments in quality improvement. Moreover, only
rewarding top performers may discourage healthcare
providers with lower baseline quality to improve their
services since for them it is difficult to outperform
healthcare providers who already have high baseline
quality [10,21,43,45]. It should, however, be noted that
there are also indications that relative performance
incentives are more effective in improving healthcare
quality since they offer an ongoing incentive for initial
high-quality providers to continue to perform well rela-
tive to their network [21].
On the basis of the current literature it is unclear
whether these findings also apply to the design of P4P
schemes to encourage delivery of care through disease
management. Since evidence for the effectiveness of
these P4P schemes is scarce, it is recommended to
design methodologically sound studies to gain insight
into the design characteristics that are most successful.
Empirical evidence is necessary to carefully design P4P
schemes and to ensure their effectiveness [10,42,43,45].
It is further recommended to determine the effect of
P4P on equity in healthcare. A recent study of Doran et
al. [46] suggests that the Quality and Outcomes Frame-
work, implemented in the United Kingdom, has the
potential to reduce inequalities in the delivery of pri-
mary clinical care. It is unknown if P4P schemes used to
stimulate delivery of chronic care through disease man-
agement will produce similar effects. It is therefore
recommended to include equity in healthcare as an out-
come in future studies in this field.
When designing P4P schemes to stimulate disease
management, it should further be taken into account
that P4P schemes may also have negative consequences
for the quality of care. A potential negative effect, also
known as the “distortion effect”,i st h et h e o r e t i c a lc o n -
cern that stimulation of efforts on the measures of
healthcare performance included in the P4P scheme
may discourage efforts on aspects of healthcare perfor-
mance that are not included and rewarded by the
scheme. As a result, P4P may result into reduced health-
care quality, rather than into the intended improved
healthcare quality [16,32]. Such potential side-effects of
P4P should be included in future studies evaluating the
effectiveness of P4P schemes.
Conclusion
The number of P4P schemes intending to encourage
delivery of chronic care through disease management is
still limited. Hardly any information is available about
the effects of such schemes on healthcare quality and
healthcare costs.
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